

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

---

DWAYNE JONES,

Plaintiff,

- v -

Civ. No. 9:12-CV-1745  
(GTS/RFT)

DR. AMBER HAWTHORNE, *Doctor, Upstate Correctional Facility,*

Defendant.

---

**APPEARANCES:**

DWAYNE JONES  
Plaintiff, *Pro Se*  
*Last Known Address:*  
11-A-1561  
Franklin Correctional Facility  
62 Bare Hill Road  
P.O. Box 10  
Malone, New York 12953

**OF COUNSEL:**

HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN  
Attorney General of the State of New York  
Attorney for Defendants  
The Capitol  
Albany, New York 12224

KRISTEN M. QUARESIMO, ESQ.  
Assistant Attorney General

**RANDOLPH F. TREECE**  
**United States Magistrate Judge**

**REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER**

Plaintiff Joseph Bloomfield commenced this action *pro se* in November 2012, seeking relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. At the time of the initiation of this action, Plaintiff was in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) and was incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility.

On March 22, 2013, the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge, conducted an initial screening of Plaintiff's Complaint. Dkt. No. 12. After directing dismissal of certain claims and Defendants, Judge Suddaby directed service on the remaining Defendant, Amber Hawthorne.<sup>1</sup> Dkt. No. 12. Within that Decision and Order, Judge Suddaby advised Plaintiff of his obligation to maintain an updated address with the Court and opposing counsel. Specifically, Judge Suddaby stated: "**Plaintiff is also required to promptly notify the Clerk's Office and all parties or their counsel of any change in his address; plaintiff's failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action.**" *Id.* at p. 23 (emphasis in original).

On April 22, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion seeking revocation of Plaintiff's *in forma pauperis* ("IFP"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), for having allegedly accumulated three or more "strikes" prior to initiating this action.<sup>2</sup> Dkt. No. 18. On May 8, 2013, while still in DOCCS's custody, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to that Motion. Dkt. No. 23. Thereafter, on February 12, 2014, this Court issued a Decision and Order denying the Motion because Plaintiff had not accumulated three strikes prior to initiating this action; Defendant was directed to respond to the Complaint.<sup>3</sup> Dkt. No. 4. A copy of that Decision and Order was mailed to Plaintiff at his last known

---

<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff's request to proceed with this action *in forma pauperis* ("IFP") was granted and the United States Marshal was directed to effectuate service on Plaintiff's behalf. Dkt. No. 12; *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

<sup>2</sup> In *lieu* of an answer, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 18. However, because the relief sought was revocation of Plaintiff's IFP status, which is not dispositive in nature, the Clerk was directed to reflect that the Motion to Dismiss was, in actuality, a motion seeking revocation of IFP status. Dkt. No. 20. In rendering this Order, this Court further noted that this was a non-dispositive issue to be decided by the undersigned directly and not upon referral from the District Judge. *Id.* We further stayed Defendant's time to respond to the Complaint pending a determination on the Motion. *Id.*

<sup>3</sup> As noted in that Decision and Order, one of the proposed strikes offered by Defendant was a dismissal of a *habeas corpus* petition. During the pendency of the Defendant's Motion, the Second Circuit issued its decision in *Jones v. Smith*, 720 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 2013), putting to rest the conflict among the District Courts by ruling that dismissals of *habeas* petitions challenging a prisoner's conviction and duration of confinement do not constitute strikes for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Dkt. No. 24 at p. 4 & n.2.

address as reflected on the Docket Report. However, on February 18, 2014, that Decision and Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable. Dkt. No. 25. In the meantime, Defendant complied with the Court's direction and filed her Answer, Dkt. No. 26, and a Mandatory Pretrial Discovery and Scheduling Order was issued, setting forth various deadlines for the progression of this action, Dkt. No. 27. A copy of that Order was likewise mailed to Plaintiff at his last known address and was, on March 10, 2014, similarly returned as undeliverable. Dkt. No. 28.

According to information publically available on the New York State DOCCS website, Plaintiff was released from DOCCS custody on July 26, 2013, after serving the maximum time of incarceration for his underlying state conviction. *See* N.Y.S. DOCCS Inmate Information website, available at <http://nysdocslookup.doccs.ny.gov> (information obtained for DIN# 11-A-1561). Since the time of such release, Plaintiff has not contacted this Court to advise of any change in his address.

In this District, all litigants have an ongoing obligation to keep their address information updated with both the Court and adversaries. N.D.N.Y.L.R. 10.1(c)(2) (“**All attorneys of record and pro se litigants must immediately notify the Court of any change of address.**” (emphasis in original)). A party’s failure to provide such information is grounds for dismissal. N.D.N.Y.L.R. 41.2(b). As then-District Judge Pooler has observed:

It is neither feasible nor legally required that the clerks of the district courts undertake independently to maintain current addresses on all parties to pending actions. It is incumbent upon litigants to inform the clerk of address changes, for it is manifest that communications between the clerk and the parties or their counsel will be conducted principally by mail. In addition to keeping the clerk informed of any change of address, parties are obliged to make timely status inquiries. Address changes normally would be reflected by those inquiries if made in writing.

*Dansby v. Albany County Corr. Facility Staff*, 1996 WL 172699, at \*1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1996) (citations omitted).

Indeed, courts in the Northern District of New York have dismissed lawsuits brought by *pro se*

plaintiffs for failure to provide a current address. *See Rivera v. Goord*, 1999 WL 33117155 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1999); *Fenza v. Conklin*, 177 F.R.D. 126 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); *Morgan v. Dardiz*, 177 F.R.D. 125 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); *Williams v. Faulkner*, 1998 WL 278288 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 1998); *Dansby v. Albany County Corr. Facility Staff*, 1996 WL 172699.

It appears that the last communication received from Plaintiff in this case was ten months ago when, on May 8, 2013, the Court received his Opposition to Defendant's Motion. Dkt. No. 23. Because the Defendant's Motion was fully briefed, we would not have expected any communication from Plaintiff during these ten months, except in certain circumstances such as providing the Court with an updated address. It is clear that in late-July 2013, Plaintiff's address changed, yet there is no indication that Plaintiff attempted to update his address with the Court. Such inaction constitute grounds for dismissal.

Furthermore, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may, in its discretion, dismiss an action based upon the failure of a plaintiff to prosecute an action, or to comply with the procedural rules or orders of the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); *see Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626 (1962).<sup>4</sup> This power to dismiss may be exercised when necessary to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. *See Freeman v. Lundrigan*, 1996 WL 481534, at \*1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1996). The correctness of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is determined in light of five factors: (1) whether plaintiff's failure to prosecute or to comply with the court's orders or procedural rules caused a delay of significant duration; (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure to prosecute or to comply would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendant is likely to be

---

<sup>4</sup> It is well-settled that the term "these rules" in Rule 41(b) refers not only to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but also to the local rules of practice for a district court. *See Tylicki v. Ryan*, 244 F.R.D. 146, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).

prejudiced by further delay; (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard; and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal. *Lewis v. Rawson*, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009); *Lucas v. Miles*, 84 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1996). In making use of this test, “[n]o one factor is dispositive, and ultimately we must review the dismissal in light of the record as a whole.” *United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc.*, 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004).

In this case, Plaintiff was released from DOCCS custody on July 26, 2013, over seven months ago, yet, we have never received an updated address, nor any alternative means by which to communicate with him. Plaintiff's failure to provide an updated address and make any inquiries as to this action evidences his apparent abandonment of this case and evinces an intent to not prosecute this action. The Court finds that this period of noncompliance with the requirement that he notify the Clerk's Office and Defendant of his current address weighs in favor of dismissal. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff was afforded proper notice of his obligation to advise the Court and counsel of his address and the consequences of his failure to comply. Any further warnings to Plaintiff would naturally fall on deaf ears as we have no way of contacting him.

The Court also finds that Defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, which may well affect witnesses' memories, the ability to locate witnesses, and the preservation of evidence. A Scheduling Order was recently issued which directs the exchange of certain discovery amongst the parties. Yet, Defendant has no ability to comply with the Court's Order if she cannot communicate with Plaintiff. With regard to the fourth factor, under the circumstances, the need to alleviate congestion on the Court's docket outweighs Plaintiff's right to receive a further chance to be heard in this case, and weighs in favor of the dismissal of this action.

Lastly, the Court has carefully considered sanctions less drastic than dismissal. Without the ability to communicate with Plaintiff, however, there is no meaningful way to procure his “reappearance” to actively prosecute this action. Moreover, simply waiting for him to comply with his obligations has not been, and is not likely to be, fruitful, since he has failed to do so for some months now. As a result, the Court finds that the fifth factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.

In sum, in light of the fact that Plaintiff cannot be located or communicated with at his address of record, and given his failure to comply with his obligation to advise the Court and counsel of any change in his address, we recommend that this action be dismissed. Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiff’s *pro se* status, we recommend that the dismissal of this action be without prejudice.<sup>5</sup>

**WHEREFORE**, it is hereby

**RECOMMENDED**, that this action be **dismissed without prejudice** pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further

**ORDERED**, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court.

**FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.** *Roldan v. Racette*, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing *Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs.*, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a).

---

<sup>5</sup> Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Date: March 13, 2014  
Albany, New York

  
Randolph F. Treece  
U.S. Magistrate Judge

R

F

T